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ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT: RETHINKING THE  
CONTRACT AGE OF MAJORITY FOR THE  
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ADOLESCENT 
WAYNE R. BARNES 
ABSTRACT 
 The contract age of majority is currently age eighteen.  Contracts 
entered into by minors under this age are generally voidable at the 
minor’s option.  This contract doctrine of capacity is based on the 
policy of protecting minors from their own poor financial decisions 
and lack of adultlike judgment.  Conversely, the age of eighteen is 
currently set as the arbitrary age at which one will be bound to her 
contract, since this is the current benchmark for becoming an 
“adult.”  However, this Article questions the accuracy of age 
eighteen for this benchmark.  Until comparatively recently, the age 
of contract majority had been twenty-one for centuries.  The age 
was reduced to eighteen in the aftermath of protest over the mili-
tary draft of eighteen-year-olds during the Vietnam War during the 
1960s and 1970s, and the enactment of the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment which lowered the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen.  
However, the appropriate age for the military draft bears little to 
no relation to the appropriate age for voting, or contracting.  
Moreover, other evidence points in the direction of age twenty-one 
as a more appropriate age of majority.  First, scientific evidence 
of brain development has advanced to the point that we now know 
the brain does not stop developing until well into the twenties, 
which means the powers of cognition and decision-making are not 
fully developed until then.  Second, sociological evidence suggests 
that most people do not perceive the full attributes of adulthood as 
having been reached until at least twenty-one, if not older.  Third, 
other areas of the law have experiences in coming back to age 
twenty-one as an appropriate marker of adulthood—these include 
the age for purchasing alcohol, the age for obtaining a credit card, 
and soon (it appears) the age for purchasing cigarettes.  This con-
fluence of evidence suggests that the contract age of majority was 
always appropriately set at age twenty-one, and a return to that 
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age of capacity for contracts will correct a historical misstep in the 
law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, an individual generally is considered to be an adult 
for contract purposes when he or she is eighteen years old.1  Most contracts 
entered into by a person that is underage (referred to as “minors” or “infants”) 
are voidable at the minor’s option.  On the other hand, contracts entered into 
by adults are not voidable for reason of capacity because of age.2  Making the 
age of contract “adulthood” age eighteen is a comparatively recent develop-
ment; the age of majority had, for centuries, been twenty-one.3  However, 
during a brief but tumultuous time of political and social upheaval in America 
in the 1960s and 1970s, largely as a result of the Vietnam War and the invol-
untary military draft that ensued for those eighteen and up, passage of the 
                                                          
 1.  JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 8.1 (7th ed. 2014); see also Cheryl B. Preston & Bran-
don T. Crowther, Infancy Doctrine Inquiries, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 47, 50 n.8 (2012) (“Under 
the common law, this line was set as the day before the minor’s twenty-first birthday.  Currently, 
the line is more often set as the minor’s eighteenth birthday rather than the preceding day.” (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981))).  
 2.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 1, at 50. 
 3.  5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9:3 (7th ed. 2009). 
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Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution resulted in a de-
crease of the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen.4  Once this happened, 
most states lowered the age of adulthood for most legal categories from 
twenty-one to eighteen, including the contract age of majority.5  It does not 
appear that a great deal of independent analysis and thought went into low-
ering the age for each of the various legal categories at this time, but rather 
something on the order of “an adult for one purpose, an adult for all pur-
poses.”6  In other words, if the age of adulthood was eighteen for purposes of 
serving in the military and voting, then eighteen-year-olds must be suffi-
ciently “adultlike” for all legal purposes, including for purposes of capacity 
to contract.7 
Forty years have elapsed since this arbitrary and sudden change, and this 
article raises the question: with the benefit of hindsight, and upon observing 
the maturity level of the typical eighteen- to twenty-year-old in the United 
States today, is the contract majority age of eighteen still warranted?  That is, 
as a normative matter, based on the facts on the ground—rather than arbitrar-
ily marrying the issue to other benchmarks, such as voting age—does it still 
make sense to say that most eighteen-year-olds possess adultlike judgment 
with respect to contractual and commercial matters such that the currently 
prevailing age of majority remains justified and defensible?  Several consid-
erations indicate that it may no longer make sense, if it ever did.  For one, 
recent advancements in the knowledge of brain and cognitive development 
shed more light than has been previously known about the age at which per-
sons become fully mature in a cognitive sense.  For another, sociologists are 
beginning to observe the phenomenon of the increasingly extended nature of 
the twenty-first century American adolescence.  The idea that young people 
are not fully adults at age eighteen has also been recognized in other compar-
atively recent developments in the law.  Based on these developments, there 
is some reason to question the continuing validity of setting the contract age 
of majority at eighteen.  This Article poses that question and proposes a so-
lution. 
Part I of the Article will discuss the rule of capacity in contract law, and 
the right of minors to disaffirm their contracts.  Part II will discuss the history 
of the age of majority—originally set at age twenty-one and then lowered to 
age eighteen—and the historical reasons and context for that change.  Part III 
will collect and discuss several observations with respect to the maturity and 
                                                          
 4.  See Jennifer Lai, Old Enough to Vote, Old Enough to Smoke?, SLATE (Apr. 23, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2013/04/new_york_minimum_smok-
ing_age_why_are_young_people_considered_adults_at_18.html (“There’s no clear reason why 18 
was chosen for the minimum voting age.”). 
 5.  Id.; see WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 9:3 (discussing age of majority for contract). 
 6.  Lai, supra note 4.  
 7.  Id.  
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cognitive abilities of adolescents and young adults, with the benefit of recent 
developments in science, sociology, and the law.  Part IV will consider 
whether a return to age twenty-one for the age of majority is warranted and 
possible objections to such a proposal.  Part V will present a conclusion. 
I.  MINORS AND CAPACITY TO CONTRACT 
In order to be able to enter into fully valid contracts, each party must 
possess, as a threshold matter, a sufficient capacity to contract.8  If a person 
lacks capacity, contract law seeks to give a remedy in order to protect that 
person against both his own unwise judgment as well as the exploitation of 
his incapacity by others.9  The two main categories of incapacity in contract 
law are: (1) minors,10 and (2) mental incapacity.11  The contract doctrine of 
capacity is, as Farnsworth describes it, a choice between “competing poli-
cies—on the one side favoring protection of the party that lacks capacity, and 
on the other favoring protection of the other party’s expectation, reliance, and 
restitution interests.”12  Thus, the contract rule of minors is generally seen as 
a reconciliation of these policy concerns: protecting the disadvantaged minor 
on the one hand, but vindicating, to some degree, the expectations of the adult 
contracting party on the other hand. 
At least one additional reason for the minor-capacity rule may exist, 
which is not as frequently cited.  According to Robert Edge in an influential 
article on the rights of minors: 
A father was due the earnings of an unemancipated minor until the 
latter reached his majority.  One way to make certain that the father 
would not be deprived of this was by allowing disaffirmation of 
the child’s contract when he spent his earnings on something con-
sidered foolish by his father, such as a pair of boots.  Also, if a 
minor sold his father’s cow and took the money to buy something 
for himself, the father could regain his cow if the minor could dis-
affirm the contract.13 
                                                          
 8.  1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.2 (3d ed. 2004). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  PERILLO, supra note 1, § 8.1, at 260. 
 11.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 4.2, at 442.  Because this Article is only concerned with the 
rule of minors and strict “age” capacity, I will henceforth limit my focus to that rule.  Other types 
of incapacity have existed in contract law.  For instance, at one point, “the common law regarded a 
woman’s marriage as depriving her for the life of her husband of separate legal identity, including 
the capacity to contract, but this disability was largely removed by statutes enacted in the nineteenth 
century, long before women were given the right to vote.”  Id. at 442–43. 
 12.  Id. at 443. 
 13.  Robert G. Edge, Voidability of Minors’ Contracts: A Feudal Doctrine in a Modern Econ-
omy, 1 GA. L. REV. 205, 221–22 (1967) (footnotes omitted) (citing James L. Sivils, Jr., Comment, 
Contracts—Capacity of the Older Minor, U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 230 (1962); and then citing 2 
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 245 (3d. ed. 1959)). 
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In fact, the general rule remains today that a minor’s wages belong to 
the parents; the rule is seen as reciprocal in nature to the corresponding duty 
of the parents to give support to the child.14  Seen in this light, the capacity 
rule is thus also a rule of protection for the parents, as well as the minor. 
In any event, the law has always been clear that the rule for age capacity 
is a bright-line, arbitrary, age-based one.  Once a person attains a particular 
age, she is presumptively an adult and can legally enter into valid contracts.15  
The bright-line rule, however, does not take into account the fact that differ-
ent people obviously have different levels of maturity at different ages.16  
Moreover, in most jurisdictions it makes no difference if the minor is married 
or emancipated from her parents—she will be protected by the rule until 
reaching the age of majority, regardless.17  As mentioned above, for centuries 
the age of majority for contract purposes was twenty-one.18  However, in the 
1970s, most states reduced the age of majority to age eighteen in the after-
math of the reduction of the voting age to eighteen by constitutional amend-
ment.19  The history of the original age of twenty-one as the majority age, as 
well as the historical reasons and context for lowering it to age eighteen, is 
of course part and parcel to the thesis of this Article, and will be discussed in 
much more detail in the next Part and beyond.  For now, the point is that the 
applicability of the rule of age-based capacity in contracts is a very simple 
one: once one attains the specified age, she attains capacity to contract and is 
deemed by the law to have sufficient age, maturity, and judgment to safely 
enter into contracts which are binding and non-voidable.20 
The legal effect of a minor entering into a contract is that the contract is 
voidable at the minor’s option.21  The reason is that the “law recognizes that 
[minors] . . . are not fully accountable for their actions because they lack the 
                                                          
 14.  See 59 AM. JUR. 2D, Parent and Child § 39 (2012); see also WILLISTON, supra note 3, 
§ 9:4. 
 15.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 4.3, at 443. 
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id. at 444 (citing Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, 158 N.W.2d 288 (Wis. 1968)).  But see 
ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.020 (providing that when a person marries, he or she “arrives at the age of 
majority”); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 963 S.W.2d 222, 223 (Ky. App. 1998) (providing that marriage of 
a minor “emancipates the minor [but] does not . . . make the minor sui juris” and may “be indicative 
of a lack of wisdom and maturity”). 
 18.  WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 9:3, at 8 (citing Jones v. Jones, 72 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1934)); 
see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 4.3, at 443. 
 19.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 4.3, at 445. 
 20.  Of course, reaching the age of majority does not prevent a person from arguing that other 
problems with the contract exist, such as mistake.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§§ 153–154 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).  See also id. §§ 163–64 (misrepresentations); id. §§ 174–75 
(duress); id. § 177 (undue influence); id. § 178 (public policy grounds); id. § 208 (unconscionabil-
ity). 
 21.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 4.4, at 446 (citing 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 51 (1926)). 
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capacity to exercise mature judgment.”22  Farnsworth explains the operation 
of the rule: “there is a contract if no further action is taken at the minor’s 
instance, but . . . the effects of the contract can be avoided if appropriate steps 
are taken on the minor’s behalf.”23  The “steps” to avoid the contract are 
known in contract law as disaffirmance, and must be undertaken by either the 
minor or the minor’s legal representatives.24  There is no particular formula 
or method by which the minor must disaffirm.  All that is generally required 
is some form of communication of an intent to disaffirm, or conduct evidenc-
ing such intent, or pleading the defense in a lawsuit regarding the contract.25 
The minor is not, of course, required to disaffirm the contract entered 
into during minority.  She may, instead, upon reaching the age of majority, 
choose to retain its benefits and thereby give up the ability to disaffirm.  This 
is known as ratification.26  The steps involved in ratification are similarly 
straightforward as the steps for disaffirmance: “Any manifestation of an un-
dertaking to be bound by the original transaction will suffice as a ratifica-
tion.”27  A person may effect ratification verbally, in writing or orally, “or by 
other conduct such as performance or acceptance of the other party’s perfor-
mance under the contract.”28  It is worth emphasizing that the power to ratify 
is limited to those who have reached the age of majority—a minor has no 
more capacity to irrevocably bind herself to a ratification than she has the 
ability to irrevocably bind herself to the underlying contract in the first 
place.29  Most courts state that the person is required to exercise the option of 
disaffirmance within a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority, or 
she will lose such option (as a court would deem her to have ratified the con-
tract by her silence).30  However, the ultimate effect of the rule on minority 
is to give the minor flexibility—she may choose to avoid the contract by dis-
affirming it, or she may instead choose to keep the contract by ratifying it.  It 
is thus a misnomer to say that the minor’s incapacity removes the ability to 
                                                          
 22.  Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 672 (1999) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) (citing FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at § 4.4). 
 23.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 4.4, at 446. 
 24.  Id. at 447. 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id. at 447  
 27.  Id. 447–48. 
 29.  Id. at 447 (stating that “[a]n effective ratification cannot be made by one who is not yet of 
age” (citing Oubre v. Entergy Operations, 622 U.S. 422 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). 
 29.  Id. at 447 (stating that “[a]n effective ratification cannot be made by one who is not yet of 
age” (citing Oubre v. Entergy Operations, 622 U.S. 422 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). 
 30.  Id. at 448–49 (discussing Walker v. Stokes Bros., 262 S.W. 158, 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1924).  Farnsworth observes: “Although it is often said that the minor must act within a reasonable 
time after coming of age, the minor is rarely precluded from avoidance by delay, as long as there 
has been no demonstrable reliance on the transaction by the other party.”  Id. at 449 (citing Cassella 
v. Tiberio, 80 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio 1948)). 
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contract.31  Rather, the minor may contract if she chooses, but the law gives 
a safety net to the minor who makes an improvident or foolish choice by 
allowing the minor to choose to disaffirm upon reaching majority.32 
If a minor chooses to disaffirm a contract, she must generally return any 
goods or items still in her possession.  Otherwise, however, the majority rule 
is that the minor need not pay anything to the other party for use of the items, 
the value of services received (which cannot be returned), or for damage or 
depreciation of the item while in her possession and use.33  The traditional 
rationale for this position is that, “[e]ven if a minor has squandered or de-
stroyed what has been received, the loss is regarded as ‘the result of the very 
improvidence and indiscretion of infancy which the law has always in 
mind.’”34  A tiny minority of jurisdictions has refused to follow the general 
rule, going so far as to require the minor to make full restitution for all bene-
fits received upon disaffirmance, a quasi-contract recovery.35  Notably, the 
recently enacted Third Restatement of Restitution and Remedies adopted the 
minority approach.36  However, most jurisdictions do not follow this rule; 
                                                          
 31.  Although the rule seemingly gives minors complete flexibility, it must be conceded that 
the capacity rule may discourage some from entering into contracts with minors.  See id. § 4.3, at 
444 (“[M]iserable must the condition of minors be, excluded from the society and commerce of the 
world.” (quoting Zouch v. Parsons, 97 Eng. Rep. 1103, 1106–07 (K.B. 1765))).  But see id. at 445 
(“[S]ubstantial areas of commercial activity have developed that could scarcely survive without the 
patronage of those who are known to be minors.” (citing Edge, supra note 13, at 227–32)).  The 
policy issue of the willingness (or lack thereof) of others to contract with minors will be discussed 
more in Part IV, infra. 
 32.  PERILLO, supra note 1, at 261.  Perillo points out: 
Because of the one-sided power of avoidance held by the infant it might seem anomalous 
to speak in terms of the limited capacity of infants.  To some observers it has seemed that 
the infant has capacity to contract coupled with an additional power of disaffirmance.  It 
has been said that “the law confers a privilege rather than a disability.”  
Id. (quoting LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS 216 (2d ed. 1965)). 
 33.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 4.5, at 450. 
 34.  Id. (quoting Utterstrom v. Myron D. Kidder, Inc., 124 A. 725, 726 (Me. 1924)).  Farns-
worth criticizes the rule, stating: “The law in this area would surely be simpler and arguably fairer 
if the minor were accountable in full for the benefit received.”  Id.  To bolster his argument, Farns-
worth quoted the New York Court of Appeals as stating:  
That young men, nearly twenty-one years of age, actively engaged in business, can at 
will revoke any or all of their business transactions and obligations, thereby causing loss 
to innocent parties dealing with them, upon the assumption or even the assurance that 
they were of age, has not appealed to some courts, and has been adopted without much 
enthusiasm by others. 
Id. at 450–51 (quoting Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat’l Sec. Corp., 188 N.E. 726, 726 (N.Y. 1934)). 
 35.  Id. at 451; see also, e.g., Valencia v. White, 654 P.2d 287 (Ariz. 1982); Kelly v. Furlong, 
261 N.W. 460 (Minn. 1935); Porter v. Wilson, 209 A.2d 730 (N.H. 1965); Bartlett v. Bailey, 59 
N.H. 408 (1879); Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N.H. 354 (1879).  
 36.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 33 (AM. LAW. 
INST. 2011); see also Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context and the Restatement 
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rather, they only require the minor to make restitution for the value of benefits 
received upon disaffirmance when an exception applies, such as the neces-
saries doctrine or misrepresentation of age.37  Such exceptions will be dis-
cussed next. 
The most-adopted exception is the well-known necessaries doctrine, in 
which the minor will be responsible for paying the reasonable value of any 
items necessary for her survival.38  The policy behind the necessaries rule is 
“that unless an infant can get credit for necessaries he may starve.”39  What 
items are necessaries is generally considered a question of law, and the de-
termination depends on a number of factors including socioeconomic status, 
as well as the extent to which the minor’s parents or guardians have failed to 
obtain the items in question.40  Items which have typically been upheld as 
constituting necessaries include food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and le-
gal services.41 
Another exception adopted by a “substantial” number of jurisdictions is 
the minor-as-plaintiff rule, whereby “the minor, as plaintiff, seeks recovery 
of money paid.”42  This is to be distinguished from the situation where the 
minor merely raises her incapacity as a defense to suit brought by the other 
party to the transaction.43  The jurisdictions that adopt this exception do so 
based on the admonition that “the privilege of infancy is to be used as a shield 
and not as a sword.”44  As Farnsworth explains the minor-as-plaintiff posi-
tion: 
 The result is that one who furnishes goods or services to a minor 
for cash is entitled to restitution in full in the event of avoidance, 
while one who furnishes them on credit is not. . . .  From the mi-
nor’s point of view, to the extent that one pays cash, one is fully 
accountable for the benefit received, while to the extent that one 
has used credit, one is not.  One is, in short, protected against im-
provident commitment but not the improvident outlay of cash.45 
The third exception that will be mentioned here, adopted by some juris-
dictions, is the minor’s misrepresentation of age—in other words, the minor 
                                                          
(Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1007, 1016–17 (2011) (crit-
icizing the Restatement’s broadening of the circumstances under which a minor may be required to 
pay restitution). 
 37.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 4.5, at 451. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. (quoting Turner v. Gaither, 83 N.C. 357, 361 (1879)). 
 40.  Id. at 451–52 (citing Int’l Text-Book Co. v. Connelly, 99 N.E. 722, 725 (N.Y. 1912)). 
 41.  Id. at 452. 
 42.  Id. at 453. 
 43.  Id. at 453–54. 
 44.  Id. at 454 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 240 (3d ed. 
1836)).  
 45.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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lies and says that she is an adult.46  Not all jurisdictions allow this exception.  
The ones that do reason that “a minor is liable for torts and a fraudulent mis-
representation of age is actionable as a tort if it induced reliance by the other 
party.”47  However, the jurisdictions that allow the misrepresentation excep-
tion generally require an affirmative misrepresentation by the minor—mere 
recitals in standard form contracts about age of majority have been held in-
sufficient.48  Many jurisdictions do not apply this exception, however, rea-
soning that to do so “would involve indirect enforcement of the contract.”49  
In any event, the misrepresentation rule appears to only be a minority rule; 
the prevailing view is that a “minor’s representation of his age does not bar 
him from disaffirming his contract.”50 
The rule allowing minors the option of disaffirming their contracts is for 
their protection.  It serves to protect them from unscrupulous adults, as well 
as their own lack of judgment and poor decisionmaking.51  As Cheryl Preston 
and Brandon Crowther have explained, “[t]he doctrine is based on the pre-
sumption that minors are generally easily exploitable and less capable of un-
derstanding the nature of legal obligations that come with a contract.”52  This 
doctrine is well settled and is designed to “look after the interest of [minors],” 
who have long been considered worthy of the law’s protection, especially in 
the area of contracts.53 
II.  THE HISTORY OF THE AGE OF MAJORITY: FROM TWENTY-ONE TO 
EIGHTEEN 
The age-based capacity rule for contracts is, as discussed above, a 
bright-line, arbitrary test—a person is presumed to lack capacity to contract 
                                                          
 46.  Id.  Examples of this occurring in pop culture are legion, but for some reason the one that 
sticks with me is the character in the movie Superbad that has a fake ID made in order to purchase 
alcohol—the ID contains the single name “McLovin.”  See SUPERBAD (Sony Pictures 2007). 
 47.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 4.5, at 454 (citing Byers v. Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 282 
S.W.2d 512 (Mo. 1955); Wisconsin Loan & Fin. Corp. v. Goodnough, 228 N.W. 484 (Wis. 1930); 
Gillis v. Whitley’s Discount Auto Sales, 319 S.E.2d 661 (N.C. App. 1984)).  
 48.  Id. (citing Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, 158 N.W.2d 288 (Wis. 1968); Rutherford v. 
Hughes, 228 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950)). 
 49.  Id. at 455 (citing Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat’l Sec. Corp., 188 N.E. 726, 726 (N.Y. 1934); 
Creer v. Active Auto. Exch., 121 A. 888 (Conn. 1923); Slayton v. Barry, 56 N.E. 574 (Mass. 1900)).  
 50.  Gillis v. Whitley’s Discount Auto Sales, 319 S.E.2d 661, 666 (N.C. App. 1984) (citing 
Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N.C. 109 (1923); Carolina Interstate Bldg. & Loan 
Ass’n v. Black, 119 N.C. 323 (1896)); see also Preston & Crowther, supra note 1, at 59–62 (2012) 
(discussing the misrepresentation exception and its possibly inconsistent application). 
 51.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 1, at 50. 
 52.  Id. (citing City of New York v. Stringfellow’s of N.Y., Ltd., 684 N.Y.S.2d 544, 550–51 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Loveless v. State, 896 N.E.2d 918, 920–21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). 
 53.  Stringfellow’s of N.Y., 684 N.Y.S.2d at 551 (“It is the policy of the law to look after the 
interests of infants, who are considered incapable of looking after their own affairs, to protect them 
from their own folly and improvidence, and to prevent adults from taking advantage of them.”). 
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(thereby giving her the power of disaffirmance) up until the moment she 
reaches the age of majority.  Therefore, this area of the law has always oper-
ated by selecting a specific age as the benchmark, even though such arbitrary 
line drawing is imperfect because the actual maturity, wisdom, and judgment 
of people at various ages differs considerably.54  Although the law could in-
stead opt for a more flexible, case-by-case approach to determine the wisdom 
and maturity of each minor in a dispute, “[t]he costs and uncertainties of dis-
tinguishing the capacities of minors . . . preclude any rule except an arbitrary 
one.”55 
Williston notes that “[f]or centuries, the age of 21 was fixed by the law 
as that age at which either a man or a woman was regarded by the law as 
acquiring full capacity.”56  There is nothing magical about the way that the 
age of twenty-one was historically selected.57  Various cultures and civiliza-
tions have adopted different ages at different times, sometimes (but not al-
ways) coinciding with the age for military service.58  One court described 
some significant historical ages of majority thusly: 
The male child of an Athenian citizen reached majority at 18 and 
was qualified for membership in the assembly at age 20; however, 
age 30 was a requirement for service on a jury.  In ancient Sparta, 
males did not reach majority until 31.  In Rome, increased empha-
sis on education led to a correlation of understanding of the law to 
the age of majority, which was eventually set at 14.  This prevailed 
in northern parts of Europe and in England during the ninth, tenth 
and eleventh centuries.  The expanding role of the mounted knight 
after the Norman Conquest led to heavier mail shirts and coifs, as 
well as shields and armor.  With the advent of knighthood, the age 
of majority rose to 21; for at that time, young men were first capa-
ble of meeting its physical and mental demands. . . . 
                                                          
 54.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 4.3, at 443.   
 55.  JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 24, at 46 (4th ed. 2001). 
 56.  WILLISTON, supra note 3, § 9:3, at 8. 
 57.  N.J. State Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.J., Inc. v. Town of Morristown, 320 A.2d 
465, 470 (N.J. 1974) (“There is no magic to the age of 21.”).  See also NAT’L ASS’N OF SECONDARY 
SCH. PRINCIPALS, THE CHANGING AGE OF MAJORITY 2 (1974), http://files.eric.ed. 
gov/fulltext/ED099996.pdf.  The report stated:  
Actually, there was nothing either sacred or inherently logical in establishing 21 as the 
appropriate age at which the law should recognize a person as being an adult.  There was 
a recognized need to establish some point at which the full rights and responsibilities 
were extended, and the age of 21 was tacitly agreed upon.  This apparently grew out of 
the Act of Parliament of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, which established 21 as the 
age for performing certain civic duties back in 1751.  But the age of 21 for establishing 
majority goes back even further in Anglo-American legal history—at least to 1620 when 
the age for serving in the English Army had reached this level.  This age had been rising 
for several centuries because of the increasing weight of armor.   
Id.  
 58.  N.J. State Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.J., Inc., 320 A.2d at 470.  
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From this point on, the age of 21 seem [sic] gradually to be ac-
cepted, even though the specific reasons for its appearance had 
long since passed.59 
Thus, the majority age of twenty-one was settled in England around the 
fifteenth century.60  The point, at present, is that once it was so established, it 
was accepted and endured as the unquestioned legal age of majority for a 
period approaching half a millennium.  As Andrew Schwartz has noted, 
“[t]his rule remained remarkably stable from the Middle Ages until well into 
the twentieth century.”61 
The universal move to lower the age of majority to eighteen arose out 
of public debate in the 1960s and early 1970s, primarily with respect to the 
voting age at a time when eighteen-year-olds were being drafted into service 
in the Vietnam War.62  Like the contract age of majority, prior to this time 
the voting age had always been twenty-one in the United States, as it had 
been in England before colonization.63  But something changed in the first 
half of the twentieth century: federal law authorized eighteen-year-old males 
to be involuntarily called into military service during both World War I and 
World War II.64  The need to draft eighteen-year-olds into military service 
was obviously related to the exigent national emergency needs of the time.65  
When the age for eligibility for military service dropped, however, states be-
gan discussing lowering the voting age as well.  Two states—Georgia and 
Kentucky—lowered the voting age to eighteen in the 1940s and 1950s, re-
spectively,66 and President Eisenhower even expressed support for the 
change as a matter of federal law.67 
However, the overall sentiment during and after World War II remained 
that twenty-one was the appropriate age of majority for voting and other pur-
poses besides the draft.  For example, in a 1939 poll, a mere seventeen per-
cent of the American populace was in favor of reducing the voting age.68  As 
                                                          
 59.  Id.; see also Note, Infants’ Contractual Disabilities: Do Modern Sociological and Eco-
nomic Trends Demand a Change in the Law?, 41 IND. L.J. 140, 143 (1965).   
 60.  Note, supra note 59, at 140. 
 61.  Andrew A. Schwartz, Old Enough to Fight, Old Enough to Swipe: A Critique of the Infancy 
Rule in the Federal Credit CARD Act, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 407, 410.  
 62.  Id. at 410–15. 
 63.  Id. at 410, 411; see also WENDELL W. CULTICE, YOUTH’S BATTLE FOR THE BALLOT: A 
HISTORY OF VOTING AGE IN AMERICA 2–3 (1992)). 
 64.  Id. at 411 (citing CULTICE, supra note 63, at 16, 20). 
 65.  Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement on Signing the Bill Reducing the Draft Age (Nov. 13, 
1942), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16198 (“The time has now come when the suc-
cessful prosecution of the war requires that we call to the colors the men of eighteen and nineteen.  
Many have already volunteered.  Others have been eagerly awaiting the call.  All are ready and 
anxious to serve.”). 
 66.  CULTICE, supra note 63, at 206. 
 67.  Id. at 51, 56. 
 68.  Schwartz, supra note 61, at 411 (citing CULTICE, supra note 63, at 53). 
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Schwartz notes, “[t]he prevailing view of lawmakers and their constituents in 
the immediate post-war years remained what it had been for centuries, 
namely that the voting age should be twenty-one.”69  Numerous attempts to 
lower the voting age, both state and federal, in the 1950s and 1960s ended in 
failure.70  The popular opinion seemed to remain that the age to fight had little 
to nothing to do with the age to vote.71  Therefore, as of 1970, the voting age 
remained twenty-one under federal law and in all but four of the states.72 
The era of the Vietnam War appears to be what finally turned the tide.73  
Eighteen-year-olds were subject to the draft again; “[t]his time, however, the 
movement to lower the voting age to eighteen was carried along as part of 
the massive civil rights, antiwar, counterculture, and other social movements 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s.”74  Many youth organizations forcefully 
advocated for the reduction in voting age, but they were not alone—other 
groups joined their cause, including the NAACP, the National Education As-
sociation, the American Jewish Committee, and the United Auto Workers 
union.75  The oft-used slogan for the cause was “[o]ld enough to fight, old 
enough to vote.”76  The principle argument, in the face of soldiers dying daily 
in Vietnam, was that it was “surely unjust . . . to command men to sacrifice 
their lives for a decision which they had no part in making.”77 
In the face of these youthful protests, and the dynamics at work in send-
ing eighteen-year-olds to war under a political regime they had had no say in 
selecting, public opinion shifted.  Eighteen-year-olds were increasingly seen 
as adults with greater maturity.78  President Nixon at the time argued in favor 
of lowering the voting age: “The younger generation today is better educated, 
it knows more about politics, more about the world than many of the older 
people.  That is why I want them to vote, not because they are old enough to 
                                                          
 69.  Id. at 411–12 (citing CULTICE, supra note 63, at 44–49). 
 70.  Id. at 412; CULTICE, supra note 63, at 141–59, 206. 
 71.  See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 226 (rev. ed. 2009) (noting New York Congressman Emanuel 
Celler’s point that “[t]he thing called for in a soldier is uncritical obedience, and that is not what 
you want in a voter”). 
 72.  See CULTICE, supra note 63, at 206 (listing Georgia, Kentucky, Alaska and Hawaii as the 
four states that successfully lowered the voting age to eighteen prior to 1970). 
 73.  Schwartz, supra note 61, at 412. 
 74.  Id. (citing KEYSSAR, supra note 71, at 279; Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 488 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1971)). 
 75.  Id.; CULTICE, supra note 63, at 99. 
 76.  Schwartz, supra note 61, at 412 (citing CULTICE, supra note 63, at 234). 
 77.  Id. (citing Lowering the Voting Age to 18: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 20–21 (1968) (statement of R. 
Spencer Oliver, President, Young Democratic Clubs of America); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 
112, 141–42 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
 78.  Id. at 413 (citing CULTICE, supra note 63, at 98). 
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fight but because they are smart enough to vote.”79  A court opinion from this 
same era reflected this view: “[T]oday’s youth is better informed and more 
mature than any other generation in the nation’s history.”80  Even anthropol-
ogist Dr. Margaret Mead testified that the eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds 
at that time “are not only the best educated generation that we have ever had, 
and the segment of the population that is better educated than any other 
group, but also they are more mature than young people in the past.”81  There-
fore, as Andrew Schwartz notes, “[a]ll of this was a sea change from the view 
of eighteen-year-olds as infants that prevailed from the Middle Ages through 
the 1950s.”82 
And thus, in the onslaught of protest, the dynamics of the Vietnam War, 
and politicians joining the chorus, public opinion shifted by the end of the 
1960s to substantial approval of reducing the voting age to eighteen.83  From 
there, the political machinations sprang into action.  In 1970, with bipartisan 
support, Congress added an amendment to the Voting Rights Act to lower 
the voting age to eighteen for all elections at both the state and federal level.84  
Soon after, the Supreme Court subsequently held in Oregon v. Mitchell85 that 
the statutory attempt to set the required state voting age was unconstitu-
tional.86  But the political and public desire for a conclusive resolution of the 
matter was such that mere unconstitutionality was no serious obstacle.  In the 
swiftest amendment process in the history of the United States (about 100 
days from congressional approval to requisite state approvals), the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment was passed, constitutionally extending the right to vote to 
all citizens eighteen years of age or older.87  In the aftermath of the enactment 
of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, all states modified their laws to lower the 
voting age to eighteen.88  The public discussion and changes to the voting 
                                                          
 79.  Lewis J. Paper, Note, Legislative History of Title III of the Voting Rights Act of 1970, 8 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 136 (1970) (quoting Hearings on S.J. Res. 147 and Others Before the 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 129, 
130 (1970) (unpublished transcripts of hearings)).  
 80.  Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 488 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1971). 
 81.  S. REP. NO. 92-26, at 4 (1971). 
 82.  Schwartz, supra note 61, at 413–14. 
 83.  Id. at 414; THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. 83-103 GOV, THE 
EIGHTEEN YEAR OLD VOTE: THE TWENTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT AND SUBSEQUENT VOTING RATES 
OF NEWLY ENFRANCHISED AGE GROUPS 7 (1983), https://digital.library.unt.edu /ark:/67531/meta-
crs8805/m1/1/high_res_d/83-103GOV_1983May20.pdf (noting a sixty-four percent approval rate 
among Americans for lowering the voting age to eighteen, according to a 1967 Gallup poll). 
 84.  CULTICE, supra note 63, at 125, 137. 
 85.  400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
 86.  Id. at 117–18. 
 87.  U.S. CONST. amend XXVI; Schwartz, supra note 61, at 414 (citing CULTICE, supra note 
63, at 214). 
 88.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 581–83 (2005) (listing in Appendix B state statutes 
establishing minimum voting ages). 
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age, however, had further reverberations.  The age of required juror service 
and the age at which the death penalty could be assessed were also subse-
quently lowered in most states to eighteen.89 
This wave of age-reductions in the law also reached the law of contracts.  
Indeed, during the ongoing national discussion on lowering the voting age in 
the 1960s and 1970s, reference was also frequently made to the additional 
benefit of giving American youth “a piece of the action”—in other words, 
the ability to make contracts and engage in business, commerce, and entre-
preneurship.90  The longstanding rule of twenty-one as the contract age of 
majority was seen as a serious impediment to this ideal.  Therefore, in a wave 
of state statutory changes that mirrored the debate and processes of reducing 
the voting age, the vast majority of states lowered the age of majority for 
contract purposes from twenty-one to eighteen.91  At least some commenta-
tors expressed confusion: “[p]erhaps less clearly understood than the reason 
for establishing the age of majority at 21 are the reasons many states began 
reducing it suddenly after so many years.”92  The nationwide change was so 
complete that when the Restatement (Second) of Contracts was promulgated 
in 1979, it provided that the contract age of majority was eighteen.93  Thus, 
when the dust of the turbulent 1960s and 1970s had settled, the contract age 
of majority, along with the military draft age and voting age, came to be fixed 
at the age of eighteen. 
III.  EMERGING EVIDENCE OF POST-EIGHTEEN ADOLESCENCE 
Since the voting age was lowered to eighteen in the early 1970s, eight-
een has also remained as the age of majority for contracting.  However, in the 
decades that have gone by, research and developments in the law have 
emerged that arguably establish that age eighteen is not the most appropriate 
legal demarcation between adolescence and adulthood for contract (and per-
haps other) purposes.  This Part will gather and discuss some of this evidence, 
which has been developed in the scientific, sociological and legal fields. 
                                                          
 89.  Schwartz, supra note 61, at 415, 416. 
 90.  Id. at 417 (quoting CULTICE, supra note 63, at 98, 103). 
 91.  See FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, § 4.3, at 445; MURRAY, supra note 55, § 24, at 45 n.208 
(“The twenty-sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution lowered the voting age to 18.  This 
prompted almost all of the states to enact statutes reducing the age of majority for contracting to 
18.” (citing 23 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 5101 (2000))); PERILLO, supra note 1, § 8.1, at 260 (citing U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE LEGAL STATUS OF ADOLESCENTS 1980 (1981)); 
WILLISTON, supra note 3, at § 9:3, at 14–15 (citing state statutes enacting majority age of eighteen). 
 92.  NAT’L ASS’N OF SECONDARY SCH. PRINCIPALS, supra note 57, at 2. 
 93.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Unless a statute 
provides otherwise, a natural person has the capacity to incur only voidable contractual duties until 
the beginning of the day before the person’s eighteenth birthday.”). 
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A.  Emerging Scientific Evidence of Adolescent Brain Development 
Scientific research over the past several decades has confirmed what we 
have known for centuries: that adolescents lack the sophistication, reasoning 
ability, and judgment of mature adults.  One basis that has led researchers to 
conclude that adolescents are less mature is their behavior.94  Behavior man-
ifests lack of maturity in at least three ways.  First, adolescents are bigger 
risk-takers than adults, because they are more highly driven by the desire for 
immediate gratification than adults.95  Second, minors have less impulse con-
trol, and thus are “less able than adults to consistently reflect before they 
act.”96  Gaining the ability to control impulses is critical for effective problem 
solving, logical thinking, and reliably dependable discernment.97  Third, ad-
olescents have a poorer ability to regulate their emotions: “stress can affect 
adolescents’ ‘ability to effectively regulate behavior as well as . . . to weigh 
costs and benefits and override impulses with rational thought.’”98 
While the developmental patterns of adolescent behavioral immaturity 
have long been known and identified, the increasing role of neuroscience in 
this area of study has provided new explanations for such behavior.99  Spe-
cifically, the development of MRI scans in the 1990s yielded revealing new 
information about the young brain.100  By using MRI images, researchers are 
able to observe the level and extent of the growth of total brain mass, as well 
as subsequent pruning of the mass and eventual myelination of the brain mat-
ter—all of which scientists have found is necessary and part of the maturation 
of the brain.101  Notably, researchers have recently discovered that the pre-
frontal cortex—associated with impulse control, assessment of risk, determi-
nation of advantages and disadvantages, and general decisionmaking—is un-
derdeveloped throughout adolescence as a result of unfinished pruning and 
incomplete myelination.102  These two processes—pruning and mye-
lination—operate to simultaneously reduce brain matter, and thicken what 
                                                          
 94.  Cheryl B. Preston & Brandon T. Crowther, Legal Osmosis: The Role of Brain Science in 
Protecting Adolescents, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 454 (2014). 
 95.  Id. at 455 (citing Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n and the Am. Acad. Of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 7, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) 
(Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) [hereinafter Graham AMA Brief]). 
 96.  Id. at 456 (quoting Graham AMA Brief, supra note 95, at 9). 
 97.  AMA Brief, supra note 95, at 8–9. 
 98.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 95, at 457 (quoting Graham AMA Brief, supra note 95, at 
11); see also Linda Patia Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 
24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 417, 422–23 (2000)). 
 99.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 94, at 458. 
 100.  Graham AMA Brief, supra note 95, at 13; MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND 20–21, 138 (2d ed. 2002); Preston & Crowther, supra 
note 94, at 458. 
 101.  Preston & Crowther, supra note 94, at 458–59. 
 102.  Id.; Graham AMA Brief, supra note 95, at 16–24. 
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remains at the same time, in a process which brings the brain to its ultimate 
maturity.  The processes are described more technically as follows: 
Pruning involves the “programmed elimination of unused and 
cumbersome neuronal connections believed to support the ability 
for the brain to adapt to its environment,” which “enhance[s] the 
ability to process complex information quickly allowing the brain 
to make executive plans supporting voluntary control of behavior.”  
Myelination consists of “the process by which the brain’s axonal 
connections become progressively insulated with a fatty white 
matter called myelin,” which “makes communication between dif-
ferent parts of the brain faster and more reliable.”103 
The rate of this brain developmental process—which generally corre-
sponds to the rate of increasing behavioral maturity—may vary from individ-
ual to individual.104  However, certain patterns have emerged in the recent 
research.  Research conducted at the National Institute of Mental Health, 
along with several related studies, led to the conclusion that “a number of 
structural changes occur in the brain much later in adolescence than anyone 
had supposed.”105  In additional research involving mapping of the develop-
ment of the brain, scientists at Harvard and UCLA came to similar conclu-
sions and more specifically observed that “the brain undergoes massive 
changes between the ages of twelve and twenty-one.”106 
In another recent study by a team of researchers from the National In-
stitute of Mental Health, the neurodevelopmental trajectories of the human 
cerebral cortex were analyzed from hundreds of MRI scans from 375 youths 
and adults.107  The researchers undertook to study the ages of development of 
this important part of the brain,108 which comprises the outer surface of the 
gray matter of the brain.109  Various parts of the cortex regulate functions 
such as sensation and movement, but also higher cognitive functions.”110  The 
researchers identified different cortical portions of the brain.111  The ages at 
                                                          
 103.  Id. at 459 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n and the Am. Acad. of 
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 21–24, Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) [hereinafter Miller AMA Brief]). 
 104.  Ann MacLean Massie, Suicide on Campus: The Appropriate Legal Responsibility of Col-
lege Personnel, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 660 (2008). 
 105.  Id. at 660 (emphasis added). 
 106.  Richard F. Walsh, Raising the Age for Juvenile Jurisdiction in Illinois: Medical Science, 
Adolescent Competency, and Cost, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 767, 774 (2008) (emphasis added) (citing 
Adam Caine Ortiz, Juvenile Death Penalty: Is it “Cruel and Unusual” in Light of Competency 
Standards?, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2003, at 23). 
 107.  Philip Shaw et al., Neurodevelopmental Trajectories of the Human Cerebral Cortex, 28 J. 
NEUROSCIENCE 3586, 3586–94 (2008). 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Cerebral Cortex, AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY (New College ed. Rev. 1985). 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Shaw, supra note 107, at 3586. 
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which the MRI scans were taken ranged from age three-and-a-half to thirty-
three.112  Measured in several different ways, the results indicated that the 
peak accumulation of cortical thickness (brain tissue) occurred around ages 
nine to eleven, but that the crucial cortical thinning (pruning, as described 
above) critical for brain development continued through age twenty-five.113  
The researchers reiterated the implications of cortical thinning: “the age at 
which the phase of cortical thinning stops . . . is better conceptualized as the 
points of transition into the essentially stable cortical dimensions of adult-
hood.”114 
That brain development continues much longer than originally believed 
has come to be a fairly well-recognized conclusion in the literature—another 
academic article in the field states that: 
Total cortical gray matter volume peaks at about age 11 years in 
girls and age 13 years in boys. . . . Areas such as the prefrontal cor-
tex—a key component of neural circuitry involved in judgment, 
impulse control, and long-range planning—are particularly late to 
reach adult morphometry, continuing to undergo dynamic changes 
well into the 20s.115 
These studies have made their way into lay knowledge as well.  For 
instance, a June 2015 article in Scientific American described the emerging 
research on brain development, and noted: “we now know that the pre-frontal 
cortex continues to change prominently until well into a person’s 20s.”116  
The article observes the clear implication that adolescence may last beyond 
the teenage years.117  Another article in National Geographic offered the view 
that teenagers “act that way because their brains aren’t done!  You can see it 
right there in the [MRI] scans!”118 
One notable dissemination to the general public on the emerging re-
search on adolescent brain development occurred in a relatively recent PBS 
program on Frontline, entitled “Inside the Teenage Brain,” which highlighted 
the research of Dr. Jay Giedd at the National Institute of Mental Health, along 
with other researchers at McGill University.119  Dr. Giedd and his colleagues 
studied the brains of 145 children and performed MRI scans on them at two-
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 115.  Jay N. Giedd, The Digital Revolution and Adolescent Brain Evolution, 51 J. ADOLESCENT 
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year intervals.120  Dr. Giedd reported findings, similar to those discussed 
herein, that the prefrontal cortex is still developing later in adolescence than 
previously thought.  He observed: 
[in the teen years, this] part of the brain that is helping organization, 
planning and strategizing is not done being built yet. . . .  It’s sort 
of unfair to expect them to have adult levels of organizational skills 
or decision making before their brain is finished being built.121 
Dr. Giedd and his colleagues also reported that the cerebellum—a part 
of the brain which has a number of functions, but assists with high-level 
thinking, including making decisions—has been found to be changing well 
into adolescence.122  Many factors influence the development of the cerebel-
lum.  Dr. Giedd noted: 
Traditionally it was thought that physical activity would most in-
fluence the cerebellum, and that’s still one of the leading thoughts.  
It actually raises thoughts about, as a society, we’re less active than 
we ever have been in the history of humanity.  We’re good with 
our thumbs and video games and such.  But . . . children [today] 
are doing less and less [physical activity], and we wonder, long 
term, whether that may have an effect on the development of the 
cerebellum.123 
Giedd also said this about the cerebellum: “interestingly, it’s a part of 
the brain that changes most during the teen years.  This part of the brain has 
not finished growing well into the early 20s, even.”124  As Dr. Giedd later 
quipped: “In retrospect I wouldn’t call it shocking, but it was at the time . . . . 
The only people who got this right were the car-rental companies.”125   
The scientific evidence that has emerged over the last decade is fairly 
clear.  The human brain is complex, and it develops in ways we did not un-
derstand—and could not measure—prior to the twenty-first century.  More-
over, the human brain continues to develop well past age eighteen and in 
most cases into the early twenties and perhaps beyond. 
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B.  Sociological Evidence of Delayed or “Emerging” Adulthood 
University of Maryland Professor Jeffrey Jensen Arnett has developed 
and presented a sociological theory of development that lends a large degree 
of support to the scientific evidence on brain development discussed above.  
Recently, Arnett coined the term “emerging adulthood” for the age range 
from eighteen to twenty-five.126  Arnett was initially struck by a sense that 
the behaviors of his college students were different than previous genera-
tions, which was corroborated by some observed demographic shifts between 
1970 and the late 1990s—including increases in the American ages for mar-
riage and childbirth, as well as a substantial rise in the percentage of the pop-
ulation attending college.127  Based on these demographic trends, Arnett ob-
served that traditional adult roles were not being assumed as early as had been 
typical before this time.128 
Therefore, Arnett proposed a novel theory of development for ages 
eighteen to twenty-five, which he has labeled “emerging adulthood.”  He 
noted that this new, culturally constructed, life phase theory was “neither ad-
olescence nor young adulthood but is theoretically and empirically distinct 
from them both.”129 
In order to support his theory of emerging adulthood, Arnett looked at 
several key areas in which people ages eighteen to twenty-five were concep-
tually distinct demographically, subjectively, and in other ways.  With re-
spect to demographic distinctions, Arnett again noted the degree to which 
demographic indicators changed from the early 1970s to the present.130  The 
fact that people undertake marital and parental roles later in life, Arnett 
claimed, has “made a period of emerging adulthood typical for young people 
in industrialized societies.”131  Interestingly, however, in surveys conducted 
by Arnett, he discovered that the people in this age range did not necessarily 
view attaining those and other demographic statuses—setting up a permanent 
residence, finishing college, beginning a stable career, and marrying—as crit-
ical to achieving adulthood.  Upon realizing this, Arnett took surveys based 
on their subjective opinions of adulthood attainment and what was critical to 
becoming an adult.132 
                                                          
 126.  Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens 
Though the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 469 (2000). 
 127.  Id. at 469 (citing Jeffrey Jensen Arnett & Susan Taber, Adolescence Terminable and Inter-
minable: When Does Adolescence End?, 23 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 517 (1994); Suzanne M. 
Bianchi & Daphne Spain, Women, Work, and Family in America, POPULATION BULL., Dec. 1996, 
at 1). 
 128.  Id.  
 129.  Id. at 469–70. 
 130.  Id. at 470. 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Id. at 471–73. 
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The subjective qualities that the respondents viewed as the most relevant 
to whether adulthood had been attained were comprised of three individual 
characteristics: (1) “accepting responsibility for one’s self”; (2) “making in-
dependent decisions”; and (3) “becoming financially independent.”133  In 
keeping attainment of these characteristics in mind, Arnett surveyed over 500 
people from ages twelve though fifty-five, and asked the question: “Do you 
feel that you have reached adulthood?”134  Respondents were allowed three 
choices: “yes,” “no,” or “yes and no.”  For the age group eighteen to twenty-
five, nearly sixty percent responded “yes and no” (about forty percent said 
“yes”).135  Only after the three individual characteristics listed above 
“reached fruition” did the respondents feel that they had fully reached adult-
hood.136  Importantly, Arnett noted that “[f]or most young people in Ameri-
can society, this occurs some time during the twenties and is usually accom-
plished by the late twenties.137 
Arnett noted other considerations that supported his theory of emerging 
adulthood.  First, he pointed to the well-researched literature on adolescent 
risk-taking and compulsive behavior, such as, for example, “unprotected sex, 
most types of substance use, and risky driving behaviors such as driving at 
high speeds or while intoxicated.”138  As an example, Arnett includes data 
from a known study on the rates at which various age groups engaged in 
                                                          
 133.  Id. at 473 (citing Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Learning to Stand Alone: The Contemporary Amer-
ican Transition to Adulthood in Cultural and Historical Context, 41 HUM. DEV. 295 (1998) [here-
inafter Arnett, Learning to Stand Alone]; Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Young People’s Conceptions of the 
Transition to Adulthood, 29 YOUTH & SOC’Y 1 (1997) [hereinafter Arnett, Young People’s Con-
ceptions]; A. L. Greene et al., Stages on Life’s Way: Adolescents’ Implicit Theories of the Life 
Course, 7 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 364 (1992); Scott D. Scheer et al., Adolescents Becoming Adults: 
Attributes for Adulthood, Poster presented at the biennial meeting of the Society for Research on 
Adolescence, San Diego, CA (Feb. 1994)).  Arnett noted that “[p]arenthood ranks low in young 
people’s views of the essential criteria for adulthood for people in general, but those who have had 
a child tend to view becoming a parent as the most important marker of the transition to adulthood 
for themselves.”  Id. 
 134.  Id. at 472 fig.2. 
 135.  Id.  The other responses were as follows (percentages approximate): (1) 12–17: 18% yes, 
38% no, 45% yes and no; (2) 26–35: 65% yes, 2% no, 33% yes and no; (3) 36–55: 90% yes, 2% no, 
6% yes and no.  Id.  The “yes and no” category was described as ambiguous: “in some respects yes, 
in some respects no.”  Id.  As Arnett described it:  
This reflects a subjective sense on the part of most emerging adults that they have left 
adolescence but have not yet completely entered young adulthood.  They have no name 
for the period they are in—because the society they live in has no name for it—so they 
regard themselves as being neither adolescents nor adults, in between the two but not 
really one or the other. 
Id. at 471 (citing Arnett, Learning to Stand Alone, supra note 133; Arnett, Young People’s Concep-
tions, supra note 133; Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Are College Students Adults? Their Conceptions of the 
Transition to Adulthood, 1 J. ADULT DEV. 213 (1994)).  
 136.  Id. at 473.  
DEVELOPMENTAL REV 139. Id. at 475 fig.3 (citing Jerald G. Bachman et al., supra note 138, at 118). 
DEVELOPMENTAL REV 139. Id. at 475 fig.3 (citing Jerald G. Bachman et al., supra note 138, at 118). 
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binge drinking, which showed that the percentage of respondents that had 
engaged in binge drinking steadily increased until the peak ages of twenty-
one to twenty-two (where it hit approximately forty percent), and then stead-
ily decreased with age throughout the twenties.139  Similar results have been 
established for substance use, which “rises to a peak in the early twenties 
during the role hiatus of emerging adulthood, declines steeply and sharply 
following marriage, and declines further following the entry to 
parenthood.”140  According to Arnett, these findings illustrate two factors 
emerging adults experience, which allow them to more freely pursue their 
own experiences.  First, they are no longer considered adolescents and thus 
can act without meaningful parental supervision and, second, they are not yet 
tied down by marital or parental responsibilities.141  In short, they enjoy many 
of the benefits of traditional adulthood, with few of the responsibilities. 
Arnett addresses an interesting historical shift in attitudes and percep-
tions towards adolescence that occurred over the course of the twentieth cen-
tury.  He cites G. Stanley Hall as the pioneer of the study of adolescence as a 
scientific endeavor, with the publication of Hall’s two-volume treatise on the 
subject in 1904, and states that Hall’s role in this regard is “widely known.”142  
Arnett points out, however, that a less known aspect of Hall’s scholarship is 
that he contended that adolescence endured through age twenty-four (as op-
posed to the then more traditionally viewed endpoint of age of eighteen or 
nineteen).143  Arnett posits two possible explanations for the change in per-
ception of the end of adolescence to the lower age of eighteen.  One explana-
tion is the reduction of the age of the onset of puberty—a century ago, the 
median age of menarche was around fifteen; it declined steadily through the 
twentieth century and is now closer to twelve-and-a-half.144  This potentially 
explains a different perceived beginning point for adolescence.  Additionally, 
Arnett believes that what may explain a different perceived ending point for 
adolescence is high school: “[i]n 1900, only 10% of persons ages 14–17 were 
enrolled in high school.  However, this proportion rose steeply and steadily 
over the course of the 20th century to reach 95% by 1985.”145  He speculates 
that it would not have made any sense for Hall to choose age eighteen as the 
                                                          
 139.  Id. at 475 fig.3 (citing Jerald G. Bachman et al., supra note 138, at 118). 
 140.  Id. at 475. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 476 (citing G. STANLEY HALL, 1 ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS 
RELATION TO PHYSIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION, AND 
EDUCATION (1904)). 
 143.  Id.  
 144.  Id. (citing Jeanne Brooks-Gunn & Roberta Paikoff, Sexuality and Developmental Transi-
tions During Adolescence, in HEALTH RISKS AND DEVELOPMENTAL TRANSITIONS DURING 
ADOLESCENCE 190 (John Schulenberg et al., eds., 1997); PHYLLIS EVELETH & J. TANNER, 
WORLDWIDE VARIATION IN HUMAN GROWTH (1976)). 
 145.  Id. (citing Arnett & Taber, supra note 127, at 517–37). 
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end point of adolescence in 1900, because no particularly important transi-
tions occurred then: “Education ended earlier, work began earlier, and leav-
ing home took place later.  Marriage and parenthood did not take place for 
most people until their early twenties or midtwenties, which may have been 
why Hall designated age 24 as the end of adolescence.”146  On the other hand, 
of course, turning eighteen now signals a significant transition and cessation 
of the typical presence of several factors—living with parents, experiencing 
puberty, and attending high school.147 
Finally, Arnett makes the case that emerging adulthood should hence-
forth be perceived as a separate, conceptually distinct life stage—subsequent 
to adolescence, but prior to adulthood.148  He cites several reasons for this 
conclusion.  First, he reiterates the data: “most young people in this age pe-
riod [18-25] would disagree that they have reached adulthood.  They see 
themselves [instead] as gradually making their way into adulthood . . . .”149  
Arnett also reasons that it makes no sense to lump ages eighteen through 
thirty into one age group, “young adulthood,” because the eighteen to twenty-
five period is quite distinct from the thirties and beyond.  The majority of 
people ages eighteen to twenty-five are single, childless, and still getting ed-
ucation and training for an eventual career.  In contrast, most people in their 
thirties have settled into a defined career path, married and have at least one 
child.150  Although exceptions to these patterns surely exist, Arnett believes 
that “[e]merging adulthood and young adulthood should be distinguished as 
separate developmental periods.”151 
Other scholars, in addition to Arnett, have identified similar trends.  
Tom Smith wrote on the gathering and study of age norms for a variety of 
transitions to adulthood, conducted by the Network on the Transitions to 
Adulthood of the MacArthur Foundation.152  The study inquired as to the im-
portance of seven different indicators to becoming an adult (either extremely 
important, quite important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at 
                                                          
 146.  Id. at 476 (citing Arnett & Taber, supra note 127). 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. at 477.  Arnett actually refers here to the distinction between “emerging adulthood” and 
“young adulthood,” but what he means by young adulthood here is the attainment of most of the 
attributes of full adulthood and responsibility.  Id.  Therefore, for all intents and purposes, he means 
transcending the “emerging adulthood” label and becoming, simply, an adult. 
 149.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id.  Arnett also notes that the concept of emerging adulthood can vary considerably by 
culture or country.  Id. at 477–78.  For instance, he notes that the median age of marriage in women 
is generally higher (twenty-five to almost twenty-seven) in the Western and industrialized countries, 
then it is in the developing countries (eighteen to twenty-two).  Id. at 478.   
 152.  Tom W. Smith, Coming of Age in Twenty-First Century America: Public Attitudes To-
wards the Importance and Timing of Transitions to Adulthood, 29 AGEING INT’L 136, 137–38 
(2004). 
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all important), and by what age the transition should occur.  The seven indi-
cators were: 
 
a.  Financially independent from their parents/guardians 
b. No longer living in their parents’ household 
c. Completed their formal schooling 
d. To be employed full-time 
e. Be capable of supporting a family financially 
f. Have a child 














The results of Smith’s study were as follows154: 
 
 Mean Age Indicator 
Should Occur 
 








22.3 72.3 17.9 7.0 2.1 0.8 
Employed 
Full-time 
21.2 61.0 22.8 11.7 3.8 0.7 
Supporting 
a Family 
24.5 60.3 22.0 11.2 4.6 1.8 
Financially 
Independent 
20.9 47.4 33.5 16.0 2.1 1.0 
                                                          
 153.  Id. at 138. 
 154.  Id. at 139 tbl.1.  




21.1 29.3 27.9 25.0 13.3 4.4 
Married 25.7 19.1 14.1 21.6 24.0 21.1 
Have a 
Child 
26.2 15.8 13.2 23.3 25.3 22.4 
 
The results are listed in the order of what percentage believed the factor 
was “extremely important.”  As can be seen, completing an education was 
the factor most commonly viewed as extremely important, followed by full-
time employment, being capable of supporting a family, being financially 
independent, and not living with parents.155  All of these factors were seen as 
either extremely important or quite important (combined) by a substantial 
majority of the respondents.156  Moreover, although the mean ages at which 
the respondents thought each of these transition indicators should occur var-
ied, none of the mean ages were appreciably younger than twenty-one.157 
The survey results discussed by Arnett and Smith above are fully cor-
roborated by actual demographic data.  For instance, the Census Bureau has 
collected data on the median age of first marriages from 1890 to the present.  
This data shows that the median age of marriage in men was twenty-six years 
old in 1890 (twenty-two for women), which fell steadily until it reached a 
low in the 1950s and early 1960s (a little over twenty-two in men and around 
twenty in women).158  It rose again throughout the 1970s and beyond, reach-
ing an all-time high in 2010 (28 in men and 26 in women).159  Similarly, 
according to data collected by the national birth registration system, the mean 
age of mothers giving birth to their first child rose from 21.4 in 1970 to 24.9 
in 2000—a 3.5-year increase.160  The percentage of eighteen- to twenty-four-
year-olds living with their parents (excluding college dorm inhabitants) is 
shown to have risen from around 24% in 2000 to over 32% in 2012.161  An 
inverse relationship has also been noted between the percentage of eighteen- 
to nineteen-year-olds in the workplace versus those enrolled in school: the 
                                                          
 155.  Id.  
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FIG. MS-2, MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE: 1890 TO PRESENT, 
https://www.census.gov/hhes/families/files/graphics/MS-2.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2016). 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  T.J. Matthews & Brady E. Hamilton, Mean Age of Mother, 1970–2000, 51 NAT’L VITAL 
STAT. REP. 1, 2 (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr51/nvsr51_01.pdf. 
 161.  David Dayen, Yes, Millenials Actually Are Living in Their Parents’ Basements, NEW 
REPUBLIC (July 9, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/118619/millennials-living-parents-num-
bers-behind-trend. 
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percentage enrolled in school rose from around 48% in 1970 to over 70% in 
2012, whereas the percentage in the workplace fell from 60% in 1970 to 
around 48% in 2012.162 
These demographic trends have helped demonstrate that the age for 
achieving adulthood has dramatically changed in the United States and most 
of the developed world.163  Because of a variety of factors, today’s young 
adults are often still fully dependent on their parents while in college and in 
search of permanent employment; as a result, age eighteen or twenty-one is 
no longer a clear indication of adulthood.164  Dr. Giedd concurs, noting that 
all of this evidence shows that adolescence appears to now extend beyond the 
teenage years, since traditional adult roles such as marriage, parenthood and 
home ownership are happening at least five years later than what was norma-
tive in the 1970s.165 
These trends have not gone unnoticed by the mass media.166  The New 
York Times observed that some of the traditional markers of adulthood—fin-
ishing education, moving out, becoming economically self-reliant, getting 
married and becoming a parent—were being realized by substantially fewer 
thirty-year-olds in 2000 than in 1960, thus observing that “[t]he traditional 
cycle seems to have gone off course.”167  This, the article concluded, seems 
to indicate that people are reaching adulthood later in life than ever in his-
tory.168  Another New York Times article, more tongue-in-cheek, bemoans the 
state of parents who have to deal with a son or daughter who has reached 
“The Terrible 32s” stage of life: 
The Terrible 32s are a perfectly normal stage in your youngish 
adult’s development, characterized by cranky self-pity over the 
discrepancy between the life she has and the one she feels entitled 
to based on popular-culture narratives and her peers’ achieve-
ments, such as those of Laura, who recently landed a big promo-
tion, and maybe it’s worth calling her to see if there’s an opening 
at her company?169 
                                                          
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Gordon Berlin et al., Introducing the Issue, 20 TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD 3, 3 (2010), 
https://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/20_01_FullJournal.pdf.  
 164.  Id. at 4. 
 165.  Giedd, supra note 116, at 36. 
 166.  Berlin et al., supra note 163, at 3. 
 167.  Henig, supra note 125.  
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Kate Greathead & Teddy Wayne, The Terrible 32s, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/02/opinion/sunday/the-terrible-32s.html.  Other media articles 
on the subject abound.  See, e.g., Richard Fry, A Rising Share of Young Adults Live in Their Parents’ 
Home, PEW RES. CENT. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/08/01/a-rising-share-
of-young-adults-live-in-their-parents-home/; Mickey Goodman, Are We Raising a Generation of 
Helpless Kids?, HUFF. POST (Feb. 23, 2012, 6:31 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/Mickey-
goodman/are-we-raising-a-generati_b_1249706.html; Is Today’s Generation Less Mature Than the 
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Accordingly, the trends described herein are not only well established 
in the academic literature and demographic data, but are present in the larger 
media and known by the lay audience, as well.  There is broad recognition 
that young people are maturing into adulthood later than had been previously 
perceived, certainly later than age eighteen. 
C.  Existing and Developing Recognition of Post-Eighteen Adolescence 
in the Legal Context 
In order to establish that there is recognition that a person does not au-
tomatically reach adulthood upon turning eighteen, the final area to be ad-
dressed is legal recognition.  A few key areas in the law either recognize a 
higher age requirement to engage in certain behavior or, when determining 
liability for potentially unlawful conduct, take maturity into account.  In do-
ing so, these areas of legal regulation seemingly recognize and corroborate 
the realities of brain development and maturity discussed in Part II.A.  Alt-
hough not necessarily exhaustive, the following areas of legal regulation will 
be discussed for present purposes: the legal drinking age, the federal Credit 
Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act, the legal smoking 
age, and the military service age.  Each of these areas helps establish, in dif-
ferent ways, that true adulthood lies beyond one’s eighteenth birthday. 
1.  Legal Drinking Age 
The national legal drinking age is twenty-one, not eighteen.170  This is 
so, on its face, because policymakers have made qualitative judgments about 
the requisite maturity level for responsible consumption of alcoholic bever-
ages.  A brief review of the history of the drinking age limit, however, is quite 
illuminating for the subject at hand. 
Unlike the contract age of majority, there apparently were no significant 
age-based restrictions on the purchase or consumption of alcohol until the 
1880s.171  These restrictions occurred at a time when governmental paternal-
ism toward adolescents was ascending in general, resulting also in mandatory 
                                                          
Previous?, YAHOO! ANSWERS, https://answers.yahoo.com/question/in-
dex?qid=20121205180301AAzPZ5Y (last visited Dec. 21, 2016).  The issue has even reached the 
entertainment world—a 2006 movie starring Matthew McConaughey, Failure to Launch, is de-
scribed with the plot summary: “A thirtysomething slacker suspects his parents of setting him up 
with his dream girl so he’ll finally vacate their home.”  Failure to Launch, IMDB, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0427229/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2016). 
 170.  21 Is The Legal Drinking Age, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 2013), https://www.con-
sumer.ftc.gov/articles/0386-21-legal-drinking-age. 
 171.  Michael P. Rosenthal, The Minimum Drinking Age for Young People: An Observation, 92 
DICK. L. REV. 649, 649–52 (1988). 
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schooling, juvenile justice, and regulations on child labor.172  By the late nine-
teenth to the early twentieth century, many states had implemented legal bans 
on selling alcohol to minors, with age limits ranging among the states from 
sixteen to twenty.173  The country’s experiment with Prohibition, of course, 
legally banned the sale of alcohol for all ages between 1920 and 1933.174  In 
1933, after the repeal of Prohibition, states reacquired legislative authority 
over alcohol, and most set twenty-one as the minimum drinking age, which 
was in line with the then-general age of majority in contract and other adult 
markers.175  The minimum drinking age of twenty-one remained unques-
tioned throughout the next four decades or so.176 
However, during the virulent Vietnam War-era protests,177 many argued 
that the drinking age should be lowered to eighteen.178  The argument was a 
perceived inconsistency between eighteen-year-olds being subject to the mil-
itary draft and in peril of death by combat, but not being allowed to vote, 
drink, or exercise other privileges of adulthood.179  As a result of the force of 
these protests, and the perceived unfairness of the scenario in which eighteen-
year-old soldiers were placed, twenty-nine states lowered their minimum 
drinking age to eighteen.180 
But in the immediate aftermath of lowering the drinking age to eighteen, 
the number of fatal accidents involving drunk driving steadily increased.181  
In reaction to this development, some states raised the age back to twenty-
one and continued collecting data.182  A study by the General Accounting 
Office reviewed several national and state studies on the correlation between 
driving fatalities and minimum drinking age and concluded that increasing 
                                                          
 175.  Id. at 307–08. 
 175.  Id. at 307–08. 
 175.  Id. at 307–08. 
 175.  Id. at 307–08. 
 176.  Rosenthal, supra note 171, at 652. 
 177.  See supra Part II. 
 178.  Rosenthal, supra note 171, at 652–53. 
 179.  Id. at 653 (citing R.L. Douglass, The Legal Drinking Age and Traffic Casualties: A Special 
Case of Changing Alcohol Availability in a Public Health Context, in HENRY WECHSLER, MINIMUM 
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 181.  Id. at 653–54. 
 182.  Id. at 654 (citing William Du Mouchel et al., Raising the Alcohol Purchase Age: Its Effects 
on Fatal Motor Vehicle Crashes in Twenty-Six States, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 249–50 (1987); Allan 
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the drinking age would result in statistically significant decreases in fatalities 
on American roadways.183 
In light of the increasingly clear data on fatalities caused by underage 
drinking and lobbying by organizations like Mothers Against Drunk Driv-
ing,184  President Reagan created the Presidential Commission on Drunken 
Driving, which ultimately concluded that all states should increase the legal 
drinking age to twenty-one.185  When this recommendation alone did not re-
sult in uniform compliance, Congress enacted the National Minimum Drink-
ing Age Act, which conditioned the states’ receipt of full federal highway 
funding on increasing the legal drinking age to twenty-one.186  Most states 
followed suit,187 so that the national minimum drinking age is, effectively, 
twenty-one.188 
The minimum legal drinking age, therefore, is an interesting national 
experiment with potential implications for the debate about adulthood and 
the age of contract majority generally.  The minimum drinking age was set at 
twenty-one in the 1930s based on a legislative assessment of the sufficient 
degree of maturity required to allow the consumption of alcohol.  In the early 
1970s, during the wave of Vietnam War-era protest, the age was lowered to 
age eighteen without much thought or analysis beyond the belief that lower-
ing the legal drinking age was “fair,” considering the exigencies of that era.189  
It was, in effect, an experiment, the results of which were quickly revealed: 
eighteen-year-olds were not sufficiently mature to handle the responsibilities 
of drinking.  The statistics bore out the irresponsibility of the policymakers 
of that time.  Even now, the statistics are compelling: “The National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration estimates that 21-year-old minimum drinking 
age laws have reduced alcohol traffic fatalities by 13 percent and have saved 
an estimated 28,765 lives since 1975.”190  This reflects the idea that drinkers 
under the age of twenty-one have poor judgment and decisionmaking, and 
                                                          
 183.  Id. at 654–55 (citing National Minimum Drinking Age Law, Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Investigations and Oversight of the Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 99th Cong. 27 
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 184.  See Treuthart, supra note 172, at 308–09. 
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are bad at assessing risk.  Therefore, it would seem that with respect to drink-
ing, the answer is clear—we have decided that a person is not an adult until 
age twenty-one.191 
2.  The Federal CARD Act 
In 2009, Congress passed the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility 
and Disclosure Act of 2009 (“CARD Act”).192  The law was designed to pro-
vide several types of consumer protections to existing and prospective credit 
card holders, including banning retroactive rate increases, clear specification 
and availability of contract terms, limitations and restrictions on the types 
and amounts of fees that may be charged, and plain language/disclosure re-
quirements.193  The provision that attracted the most media attention, how-
ever, was the provision aiming to reform credit card companies’ efforts at 
marketing to students on college and university campuses.194 
The CARD Act accomplished this legislative goal by placing re-
strictions on the ability to obtain a credit card for people under the age of 
twenty-one.195  The original draft of the CARD Act, introduced in the House, 
did not contain the provision relating to age twenty-one, but instead referred 
to age eighteen—the same as the current contract age of majority.196  How-
ever, in the Senate version amended in May 2009, the age limit was raised to 
twenty-one, and this is the version that was approved by both houses the next 
day and enacted into law.197  The CARD Act does not actually prevent people 
under twenty-one from obtaining a credit card in all scenarios; there are two 
exceptions.  The first exception provides that the underage person may obtain 
a credit card if a cosigner over the age of twenty-one agrees to accept joint 
liability for debt incurred.198  The second exception provides that the under-
age person may be issued a credit card if she “indicat[es] an independent 
                                                          
 191.  See William DeJong, POV: Legal Drinking Age of 21 Works. Deal with It., BU TODAY 
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age of 21”). 
 196.  H.R. 627, 111th Cong. § 7 (as introduced in House, Jan. 22, 2009). 
 197.  Id. § 301 (as amended in Senate, May 19, 2009); H.R. 627, 111th Cong. § 301 (2009) 
(enacted). 
 198.  CARD Act of 2009 § 301, 123 Stat. at 1748.  
 434 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:405 
 
means of repaying any obligation arising from the proposed extension of 
credit.”199 
The CARD Act provisions have been criticized by some, especially for 
their contradiction of the present contract age of majority of eighteen.  An-
drew Schwartz has remarked: “In short, eighteen- to twenty-year-olds are 
now classified by the law as adults with full capacity to enter into any con-
tract—except a credit card agreement.”200  He rues the passage of the CARD 
Act because it “reinstates—for credit card contracts—the ancient common-
law rule that those under twenty-one are infants lacking capacity to con-
tract.”201  However, Congress apparently felt otherwise, and for good reason.  
Indeed, consumer advocates had long been concerned with what was seen as 
credit card companies aggressively taking advantage of college-aged con-
sumers’ inexperience and lack of awareness of consumer finance.202  It was 
well known that credit card companies frequently utilized on-campus recruit-
ing and lures of free food, t-shirts, or other gimmicks to persuade students 
into signing credit card applications.203  The legislative history of the CARD 
Act does not provide additional insight, but the rationale was apparently ob-
vious: to protect young and naïve eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-olds 
from aggressive marketing practices of credit card companies.204  It seems 
that Congress decided that—much like with drinking alcohol—age twenty-
one was the more appropriate age at which a sufficient level of adult-like 
maturity could reliably be employed with respect to credit card accounts.  
What is notable about the CARD Act provisions is that they relate to the very 
same issues—financial maturity and sound commercial decision making—
that animate the general doctrine on the contract age of majority. 
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3.  Legal Smoking Age 
The legal minimum age for smoking is currently eighteen in the vast 
majority of states.205  The legal regulation of smoking has traveled a circui-
tous route through history.  Prior to colonization, there was a fairly large anti-
tobacco sentiment.  King James I, for example, wrote a treatise in 1604 enti-
tled Counterblast to Tobacco and declared an English ban on tobacco.206  
Cigarettes nevertheless made their debut in Europe and the United States in 
the later part of the nineteenth century.207  Beginning in the 1890s and con-
tinuing throughout the early part of the twentieth century, a temperance 
movement swept the United States and several states enacted outright bans 
on cigarettes.  Moreover, by 1940, a majority of states banned the sale of 
cigarettes to minors (at the time, still defined as those under the age of twenty-
one).208  Although the outright bans on cigarette smoking were dropped, the 
ban on the sale to minors mostly remained, albeit with various state-specific 
variations.209 
The “glamour days” of smoking commenced with the end of World War 
I and continued throughout World War II and the 1950s and 1960s.210  Soon 
thereafter, the Surgeon General’s “clarion call” in 1964 for action against the 
dangers of cigarettes initiated the national campaign against smoking.211  
Over the next three decades, multiple state and federal efforts were made to 
address the health effects of smoking.212  Efforts intensified in the 1990s; in 
1992, Congress passed the Synar Amendment to the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, 
and Mental Health Administration Reorganization Act.213  The Synar 
Amendment conditioned states’ receipt of federal substance abuse grant 
money on the states’ implementation and effective enforcement of laws ban-
ning the sale of tobacco to those under the age of eighteen.214  After the Synar 
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Amendment, forty-six states set the minimum tobacco age at eighteen, and 
four states put a nineteen-year-old age limit into place.215 
Today, there is a movement afoot seeking to raise the smoking age to 
twenty-one.  Several cities have recently already done so on a municipal 
level.216  As part of this continuing movement, Congress directed the Food 
and Drug Administration to commission a report on the potential health ef-
fects of increasing the minimum smoking age.217  The resulting report, Public 
Health Implications of Raising the Minimum Age of Legal Access to Tobacco 
Products, was issued in March 2015 by a committee of the independent In-
stitute of Medicine.218  The report “supports increasing the tobacco purchase 
age to 21 from 18, saying it would decrease early deaths, cut low birth 
weights and ‘substantially’ reduce the number of 15- to 17-year-olds who 
begin smoking.”219  Over 70% of the American public—including 58% of 
current smokers—support the proposal to increase the minimum legal smok-
ing age to twenty-one, and most respondents believe it is important to prevent 
teenagers’ use or experimentation with tobacco products.220 
Notably, the Institute of Medicine cited some of the same emerging ev-
idence of brain and social development, as were referred to in Parts III.A and 
III.B.  Specifically, the report notes that “[t]he development of adult decision-
making skills and abilities is a continuous process that begins in early ado-
lescence and continues into and through young adulthood.”221  The study also 
references the distinct period, from ages eighteen to approximately twenty-
six, which is increasingly seen as a distinct developmental phase.222  The em-
phasis on this age range, the report contended is due to two categories of 
factors—one is the current trend of delayed achievement of traditional mark-
ers of adulthood (education, marriage, and parenthood), and the other is the 
newfound scientific discovery that brain development continues well into the 
twenties.223  The report then tied these factors to decisionmaking regarding 
smoking: “[t]he unique psychosocial maturation of the adolescent and young 
adult developmental period, coupled with various environmental and social 
influences, results in a milieu that increases the desire for engaging in health-
risk behaviors, including tobacco use.”224  In short, the findings demonstrated 
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that age eighteen has come to be seen as insufficiently mature, as a general-
ized matter, to risk granting the power to choose to engage in use of cigarettes 
or other smoking products.  The report considers age twenty-one as a more 
appropriate milestone to mark the transition to adulthood for this purpose. 
Accordingly, in three different legal areas, lawmakers have considered 
and modified the age of adulthood to age twenty-one.  The minimum drinking 
age was once age eighteen, but for policy reasons it was increased to age 
twenty-one.  Similarly, the age for obtaining a credit card has been set for 
many purposes to age twenty-one rather than age eighteen.  And, at the mu-
nicipal, state, and federal level, governments have raised or are considering 
raising the minimum smoking age to twenty-one.  What all of these develop-
ments have in common is they rely on a comparatively recent recognition that 
age twenty-one is a more appropriate legal marker for adulthood than age 
eighteen. 
IV.  A RETURN TO A MAJORITY AGE OF TWENTY-ONE AND SOME 
OBJECTIONS 
The contract doctrine of incapacity is a well-established tradition of the 
common law.225  It serves to protect minors from their own foolish, improvi-
dent decisions, and from exploitation by commercial entities and adult con-
tracting partners.226  There is every reason to continue protecting minors into 
the twenty-first century because business are targeting minors for profit more 
than ever before.227  Section A presents the argument for raising the contract 
age of majority to twenty-one.  Section B outlines possible objections. 
A.  Return to a Majority Age of Twenty-One 
For more than half a millennium, the majority age for contract was 
twenty-one.228  While it may be true that this age was set as a result of the 
weight of medieval English armor229—a fact seemingly irrelevant to the cog-
nitive capacities of young persons to make contractual decisions—the reality 
is that the age was set as a matter of contract, and was unquestioned through-
out a period exceeding five centuries.  There was never any documented ob-
jection to the age nor was anyone pointing out the obvious absurdity of the 
reason for setting an age in the first place; rather, it was accepted for centuries 
as a sound basis for the arbitrary legal transition to adulthood.  There may 
have been some rough accuracy in correlating the physical development of a 
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boy being able to bear the weight of armor, which physical development 
surely mirrored the cognitive and neurological development occurring at the 
same time.  The medieval English may not have had MRIs and neuroscience, 
but they surely had a good degree of learned common sense.  The only reason 
that the age was ever lowered from twenty-one to eighteen was the convul-
sive, unique period of political turmoil that accompanied the Vietnam War 
and the protest that accompanied the military draft of those eighteen years of 
age and older.230  In essence, it was the idea that a person that was “[o]ld 
enough to fight,” was “old enough to vote.”231 
Here’s the thing—we were wrong.232  The factors that go into drafting 
able-bodied soldiers in an exigent time of war have little to nothing to do with 
the cognitive capacities necessary to vote or to contract, and they were illog-
ically conflated during the debate in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and 
the draft.  As Congressman Emmanuel Celler stated during the 1960s: 
To say that he who is old enough to fight is old enough to vote is 
to draw an utterly fallacious parallel.  No such parallel exists.  The 
ability to choose, to separate promise from performance, to evalu-
ate on the basis of fact, are the prerequisites to good voting.  Eight-
een to twenty-one are mainly formative years where the youth is 
racing forward to maturity.  His attitudes shift from place to place.  
These are the years of the greatest uncertainties, a fertile ground 
for the demagogues.  Youth attaches itself to promises, rather than 
to performance.  These are rightfully the years of rebellion rather 
than reflection.  We will be doing a grave injustice to democracy 
if we grant the vote to those under twenty-one.233  
Fighting and voting are, as Congressman Celler said at the time, “as 
different as chalk is from cheese.”234  Soldiers (certainly at the typical initial 
enlistment age of eighteen to twenty) are supposed to be “uncritically obedi-
ent,” whereas the nature of voting is to question, analyze, weigh choices, and 
“to evaluate on the basis of fact.”235  Of course, many of the same cognitive 
functions Congressman Celler discussed with respect to voting apply equally 
or to a greater extent in contracting. 
Congressman Celler’s rationale was lost in a universal, frenzied chorus 
of political support at the time for lowering the age of voting (and eventually, 
contract), in light of the perceived fairness of letting eighteen-year-olds have 
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a say in selecting the political leaders who may subsequently decide to send 
them to war.  But, these things are conceptually distinct, and the connections 
between the two were not particularly well thought out at the time.  As Mi-
chael Rosenthal put the point: 
 To the extent the Vietnam War was responsible for lowering the 
age of majority in general and the minimum drinking age in partic-
ular in a large number of states, it should be realized that the 
changes were for reasons somewhat different than the reasons an 
age of majority is usually lowered or raised.  Normally, a change 
is based on society’s view of the age that should be considered the 
age of responsible decision-making or competency.  When states 
lowered the age of majority and the minimum drinking age because 
boys were serving and dying in the War, however, they did so be-
cause society felt it was unfair to have them serve and die and yet 
not have the rights and privileges of adults.  The states did not in-
quire whether the boys were mature enough to vote or to handle 
liquor; they just deemed the treatment to be unfair.236 
Now, with the benefit of forty-plus years of hindsight, Congressman 
Celler seems prophetic.  Rosenthal’s point that the age of majority was hastily 
lowered without sound rationalization is well taken.  Their views on the ca-
pacity needed to make sound, adult-like voting decisions cohere very well 
with today’s knowledge about brain development.  We now know, due to 
advancements in modern science, that the human brain is still developing 
well into a person’s twenties—past twenty-one, usually, and certainly well 
past age eighteen.237  Therefore, we have reason to believe that age eighteen 
does not generally indicate full, neurological adulthood.  This has recently 
been corroborated by sociologists and others through observance of the typ-
ical age of traditional adult achievements, such as completing education, be-
coming residentially independent, getting married, and becoming a parent.238  
As discussed above, Jeffrey Jensen Arnett has deemed the age range of eight-
een to twenty-five as a distinct new life phase called “emerging adulthood”—
a period distinct from actual, full adulthood.239  Surveys indicate that most 
people expect that the usual markers of adulthood, including attainment of 
financial independence, should occur between the ages of twenty-one and 
twenty-six or so.240 
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We also have evidence from other legal areas that experimentation with 
age eighteen as the age of majority has been determined to be a policy fail-
ure.241  The legal age of drinking alcohol was reduced from age twenty-one 
to age eighteen during the same Vietnam War-era “old enough to fight” pro-
tests; however, we quickly changed our minds when the statistics ominously 
brought to light the poorer impulse and risk control exhibited by eighteen- 
and nineteen-year-olds in the form of marked increases in fatal highway ac-
cidents, and the age was raised back to twenty-one.242  The same transfor-
mation is now beginning with respect to legal regulation of smoking, as re-
cent studies show that the overwhelming majority of smokers begin smoking 
when they are teenagers and lack maturity and risk-assessment ability.  As a 
result of these findings, an increase of the legal minimum smoking age to 
twenty-one is being contemplated on a national level.243  And recently, the 
federal CARD Act imposed significant limits on the ability to obtain a credit 
card before age twenty-one, because of the perception that college-age stu-
dents under twenty-one were being targeted by the credit card companies 
precisely for their unequal bargaining power and their poor maturity in mak-
ing credit and financial decisions.244  These are, of course, the very same areas 
of decision and cognitive activity that are employed when a person makes 
contract decisions, and yet the contract age of majority remains eighteen at 
present. 
Age eighteen, as it turns out, is not old enough as an adult marker for all 
of these legal areas.  Frankly, it may not be a good age at which to let citizens 
vote, as Congressman Celler argued and others have more recently ob-
served.245  Of course, that is a political and, now, a constitution decision,246 
and the likelihood of changing the voting age is relatively low at this point.  
Additionally, some have even questioned whether the military draft age of 
eighteen—the starting point for this entire chronology of “proof” that age 
eighteen equals adulthood—should be retained, as opposed to raising the 
minimum age back to twenty-one.247  Interestingly, it should be noted that 
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even the military seems to recognize the concept of emerging adulthood to 
some degree.  For one, the current version of the “draft” system—the Selec-
tive Service registration system—requires all males from ages eighteen to 
twenty-six to register with the system.248  This happens to cohere with 
Arnett’s phase of “emerging adulthood” (coincidentally or not).  Moreover, 
the military has a sequence of mobilization in the event an involuntary draft 
was ever commenced in the future due to a national emergency.249  According 
to the Selective Service System website, men aged twenty will be drafted 
first, followed by ages twenty-one through twenty-five.  Notably, the Selec-
tive Service maintains that eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds will “probably 
not be drafted.”250  Although the reasons are not given, it would be reasonable 
to infer that the Selective Service plans to avoid drafting eighteen- and nine-
teen-year-olds because they are still immature and not truly adults. 
Be that as it may, the fact remains that the happenstance of soldiers be-
ing drafted into war at age eighteen in a time of national emergency is not 
probative that they are sufficiently adult-like for purposes of decisionmaking 
and contracting.  The two should never have been conflated, and little reason 
exists for them to have been treated as related other than the explosive time 
of political and emotional Vietnam War-era protest.  As Michael Rosenthal 
has stated, little thought went into lowering the age of majority, other than 
exigent-wartime emotional pleas for fairness.251  And, as Kathleen Horan has 
observed, the early 1970s may have been precisely the wrong point at which 
to lower the age, because it was just at this point that college education be-
came more normative, which in turn led to a delay in the assumption of self-
sufficiency and other markers of adulthood.252  A law review article from 
1965—several years before the reduction to age eighteen occurred—made a 
similar point: 
[T]he modern minor spends more time in attaining a formal educa-
tion than did his counterpart of even three decades ago.  He is thus 
isolated from the commercial world to a greater degree than if he 
were earning a living, and is likely to be less sophisticated in the 
ways of contract and business.  Therefore, from the standpoint of 
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the maturity of today’s youth, the age of twenty-one might be too 
low an age to grant contractual capacity.253 
More recently, Cheryl Preston and Brandon Crowther have observed 
that “[t]rends of the past few decades suggest that if legislatures were to move 
the line, the cutoff age would likely increase, not decrease.”254  Furthermore, 
the point on delayed financial independence overlaps with another reason that 
age twenty-one is more appropriate: part of the reality of the infancy doctrine 
is to allow immature minors to avoid poorly-made contract decisions, so that 
their parents will not ultimately have to foot the bill.255  If the contract age of 
majority is left at eighteen, then eighteen- and nineteen-year-old “adults” will 
be bound to their obligations, even though the reality is that this “adult” is 
still looking to her parents to bail her out (the technicality that the parents are 
not legally obligated to support their daughter at that age being outweighed 
by the relational reality that they often will).256  Shifting the age back to 
twenty-one would more closely align with the realities of most family support 
situations.257 
Accordingly, the contract age of majority should never have been low-
ered and thus should be returned to age twenty-one.  Simply put, if the goal 
of the contract law minority doctrine is to soundly and sensibly set the age at 
which we best estimate that sufficient maturation and development has oc-
curred so that contract decisions, risk assessments, and understanding can be 
appropriately undertaken, then the evidence is clear: age twenty-one is a bet-
ter benchmark than eighteen, and should likely never have been abandoned.  
Age twenty-one served contract law and other areas quite well, and was a 
venerable rule of long-lasting effectiveness for over 500 years.  Although it 
is true that rules of law should not be blindly followed simply because of their 
longevity,258 in this case the following would not be blind.  It is instead sup-
ported now by the weight of scientific knowledge, sociological research, and 
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legal experimentation.259  The age of majority is not a vested right, but rather 
is set by the will of the legislature.260  The contract age of majority could and 
should be changed by legislation across the states, in light of the compelling 
evidence of its sensibility as the more appropriate and accurate age of major-
ity. 
B.  Possible Objections 
Before concluding, I anticipate at least a few possible objections to the 
proposal to return the contract age of majority to twenty-one.  The first ob-
jection is simply a form of the one that was raised in the 1960s and 1970s at 
the time the voting age was changed: “old enough to fight, old enough to 
vote.”  This seems to be, at least in part, an argument that being an adult for 
one purpose means one is an adult for all purposes.  But this has never been 
the case.  And there are different ages for different purposes in all manner of 
contexts: 
People can vote at 18, but in some states they don’t age out of foster 
care until 21.  They can join the military at 18, but they can’t drink 
until 21.  They can drive at 16, but they can’t rent a car until 25 
without some hefty surcharges.  If they are full-time students, the 
Internal Revenue Service considers them dependents until 24; 
those without health insurance will soon be able to stay on their 
parents’ plans even if they’re not in school until age 26, or up to 30 
in some states.  Parents have no access to their child’s college rec-
ords if the child is over 18, but parents’ income is taken into ac-
count when the child applies for financial aid up to age 24.261 
It is simply not necessary that the same majority age be applied in all 
legal contexts.262  Rather, the legislature is empowered to set a particular age 
for a particular circumstance in the manner most appropriate.263 
For the particular context at issue here—contracting—it is worth mak-
ing some observations with respect to the different considerations in place.  
Military matters—where the minimum age is eighteen—are obviously based 
on potential national emergencies that create a need for many able-bodied 
fighting men and women.  Concepts of full maturity and adulthood are not as 
important as the need for a mass of soldiers who are capable of withstanding 
the rigors of training and combat, understanding the need for following or-
ders, being away from home, handling weapons safely, and performing basic, 
militaristic tasks.264  Voting is, yet again, different.  Voting involves allowing 
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the person to take part in a collective, democratic expression of majoritarian 
will.  The vote does not directly affect the person’s individual affairs, except 
insofar as the affairs of the community (or state or nation) are collectively 
affected.  However, unlike voting, contracting (like drinking) affects the in-
dividual person’s affairs directly and uniquely.  A poor decision to contract 
affects that person and that person alone—there is no other “vote” to offset 
the person’s poor financial decision.  Therefore, because of the direct impact 
of contracting on the person’s individual affairs, it is more important that one 
be sufficiently adult-like and mature before being allowed to contract, as op-
posed to being allowed to vote. 
A second foreseeable objection concerns the possible effect of an in-
crease in the age of majority on eighteen-year-olds’ access to the market-
place, since, the theory goes, companies will refuse to contract with them on 
the basis of the risk of subsequent disaffirmance.265  In the first place, it 
should be noted that minors are not prohibited from contracting; they merely 
gain the power of disaffirming any contracts they choose to enter.266  But, in 
observing that others may be dissuaded from contracting with minors, Farns-
worth quotes Lord Mansfield, who once stated: “miserable must the condi-
tion of minors be, excluded from the society and commerce of the world.”267   
Schwartz puts it more plainly: “the practical result of a judicial refusal to hold 
infants to their promises was that no one was willing to contract with them.  
The common law’s paternalism toward infants excluded them from the com-
mercial world.”268  Schwartz cites Bill Gates, Michael Dell, and Mark Zuck-
erberg as several examples of minor entrepreneurs who could not have suc-
ceeded if the age of majority had been twenty-one.269  But, there are also 
anecdotes of minors who have succeeded in entrepreneurship in spite of their 
minority status: Ashley Qualls founded WhateverLife.com at age fourteen; 
Juliath Brindak developed a social media platform at age sixteen; and Nick 
D’Aloisio designed an app worth $30 million at age seventeen.270 
But the more important point is that minor status does not seem to hinder 
companies from engaging in commercial activity with minors.  A 1965 law 
review article noted, “recent surveys show that today’s minors spend annu-
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ally more than twelve billion dollars . . . .  The business community obvi-
ously feels that the risk of disaffirmance is more than offset by the advantages 
to it and to the economy in allowing these sales.”271  Fast forward to the pre-
sent, and the willingness to engage the minor is even more prevalent: 
 Today’s children are subjected to a constant stream of advertise-
ments. . . .  Because of the increase in their disposable income, 
children and teen consumers have been recognized as a huge mar-
ket, and accordingly, advertisers have ruthlessly targeted them.  
What has emerged is the most brand-loyal, consumerist generation 
this nation has ever seen. . . .  A contract that formerly took weeks 
of negotiation and hours of reading fine print may now be sealed 
merely through a click.  Obligations can even arise when a user 
simply browses a website, without clicking anything.272 
Facebook and YouTube explicitly allow a child to create an account at 
age thirteen.273  Although other online merchants usually state they will con-
tract only with purchasers who are eighteen, the age requirement is rarely 
enforced other than in simply asking the purchaser to enter her age without 
otherwise verifying it.274  These companies are regularly engaging in com-
mercial transactions with minors, regardless of the legal age of contract.  The 
same is surely true of traditional, brick-and-mortar stores as well.  In fact, 
there are research companies that specialize in educating businesses in how 
to “tap the youth market through advertising campaigns and outreach specif-
ically designed to appeal to minors.”275  These companies are surely well-
advised on legal matters, fully cognizant of existing contract doctrine on mi-
nors, and prepared to tap into the lucrative minor market, taking any risks of 
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disaffirmance into account in their business models.276  The idea that chang-
ing the age of majority to twenty-one will suddenly keep all those under 
twenty-one from the marketplace does not seem to constitute a major cause 
for concern. 
One last objection of note is that some disagree that the rule providing 
minors’ ability to disaffirm their contracts should continue at all.277  Suffice 
it to say that I believe there continue to be good reasons for the disaffirmation 
doctrine.  Teenagers and even young adults in their early twenties lack the 
maturity, judgment, and decisionmaking ability of adults.  This has always 
been the underlying premise of the rule allowing minors to void their con-
tracts.  And now, we actually have direct scientific proof of this, whereas the 
rule has always previously been based, presumably, on observation, suppo-
sition, and experience.  But, as Cheryl Preston and Brandon Crowther have 
recently observed in defending the continued existence of the doctrine, 
“[f]ew people dispute that protecting minors from more-experienced adults 
is a worthy goal.”278  Although some believe that other doctrines—such as 
duress and unconscionability—are sufficient to protect minors, Preston and 
Crowther argue otherwise.  They contend that two factors militate against 
this argument.  First, contract law’s general weakening of the requirement of 
assent: the advent of standard form contracts, especially in the online “click” 
context, makes surprise over contract terms an ever-increasing likelihood.279  
Second, these methods are being used to impose ever more onerous terms, 
such as arbitration clauses.280  These factors in the emerging contract juris-
prudence have “diluted the chance that vulnerable minors could find relief 
outside of the infancy doctrine.”281  Therefore, sound reasons exist for keep-
ing the venerable rules of infancy in place for the protection of minors. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The age of majority should be returned to age twenty-one.  The rule that 
minors’ contracts are voidable has existed for centuries.282  It is a sound doc-
trine, which serves to protect minors from their own impulsive and foolish 
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financial decisions and to protect them from the actions of potentially exploi-
tative adults and commercial entities.283  Until very recently, the centuries-
old doctrine was accompanied by an age of majority set at twenty-one.284  The 
age was only reduced to eighteen due to a series of explosive protests in the 
face of heated and emotional opposition to the Vietnam War, and the draft of 
eighteen-year-olds into military service—eighteen-year-olds who had not 
been afforded the opportunity to vote for the politicians who then sent them 
to war.285  The resultant lowering of the voting age to eighteen by enactment 
of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment caused a ripple effect, and many other leg-
islative ages of majority were changed as well, including the contract age of 
majority.286  Whatever the wisdom of lowering the voting age, little thought 
was given to the wisdom of lowering the contract age of majority beyond the 
fairness perceived in the military draft situation.287 
However, with the benefit of modern developments in neurological sci-
ence, we now know that human brains do not fully mature until the early to 
mid-twenties and beyond.  The full powers of cognition, decisionmaking, 
risk-assessment, and impulse control are not fully developed until at least age 
twenty-one or later.288  Sociologists have also begun to observe that the ages 
eighteen to twenty-five are, in reality, a distinct life phase now referred to as 
“emerging adulthood,” in which the full adult attributes are gradually at-
tained.289  Census and demographic data tend to corroborate these findings, 
and survey results indicate that most people do not perceive adulthood (in-
cluding financial independence) as having been reached until the age of 
twenty-one or later.290  Finally, legal experimentation in the areas of alcohol, 
smoking, and credit card ownership have resulted in (or are in the process of 
trending towards) an increase in the responsible age from eighteen back to 
twenty-one.291 
With the benefit of forty years of hindsight, reflection, and the scientific, 
sociological, demographic, and legal data now available, it seems clear that 
the contract age of majority was always sensibly placed at age twenty-one.  
Now, the decision to lower the age in the early 1970s in a wave of emotional 
and frenzied protest seems to have been ill-advised.  Young people at ages 
eighteen, nineteen, and twenty are still in the formative years of attaining 
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maturity, and the reasons for minors’ need for protection in the area of con-
tract are fully applicable to those of this age.  Accordingly, legislatures should 
follow the lead provided by alcohol regulation and the federal CARD Act 
and revert the contract age of majority to twenty-one.  Only then will an his-
torical misstep in contract law be remedied. 
